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COURT AUTHORISED STERILISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INEQUALITY, DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN AND GIRLS WITH DISABILITY 
 
 
LINDA STEELE*  
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
Since at least the early 1990s, disability rights advocates have argued for the 
prohibition of sterilisation of women and girls with disability without their 
consent (‘non-consensual sterilisation’) except in that small proportion of 
instances where there is a serious threat to life.1 In part, this argument has been 
framed in terms of human rights: the act of non-consensual sterilisation (except 
where there is a serious threat to life) is fundamentally an act of discrimination 
and violence which violates multiple human rights including the rights to 
equality and non-discrimination, freedom from torture and personal integrity. In 
recent years these arguments have been increasingly supported by international 
human rights bodies which have framed non-consensual sterilisation of women 
and girls with disability as a violation of human rights and urged states parties, 
including Australia, to prohibit the practice.2  
                                                 
*  Lecturer, School of Law, University of Wollongong. Thank you to participants in ‘Feminist Perspectives 
on Medical Bodies’, University of Wollongong, 20 February 2015 for their feedback on an earlier version 
of this article. The author is grateful for feedback on drafts received from Fleur Beaupert, Felicity Bell 
and Trish Mundy, and anonymous referee comments on earlier versions. 
1  See Carolyn Frohmader, Women with Disabilities Australia, Submission No 49 to Senate Community 
Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation 
of People with Disabilities in Australia, March 2013; Carolyn Frohmader, ‘Submission to the United 
Nations Committee Against Torture’ (Submission, Women with Disability Australia, 24 September 
2014); Carolyn Frohmader, Leanne Dowse and Aminath Didi, ‘Preventing Violence against Women and 
Girls with Disabilities: Integrating a Human Rights Perspective’ (Think Piece, Women with Disability 
Australia, January 2015); Carolyn Frohmader and Stephanie Ortoleva, ‘The Sexual and Reproductive 
Rights of Women and Girls with Disabilities’ (Issues Paper presented at ICPD Beyond 2014 International 
Conference on Human Rights, The Hague, Netherlands, 7–10 July 2013); Carolyn Frohmader and 
Therese Sands, Australian Cross Disability Alliance (ACDA), Submission No 147 to the Senate 
Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Violence, Abuse and 
Neglect against People with Disability in Institutional and Residential Settings, including the Gender and 
Age Related Dimensions, and the Particular Situation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People 
with Disability, and Culturally and Linguistically Diverse People with Disability, August 2015. 
2  See generally Juan E Méndez, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN GAOR, 22nd sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/22/53 (1 
February 2013) [48]; Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 13: The Right of the 
Child to Freedom from All Forms of Violence, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/13 (18 April 2011) [16], [21]. In 
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Despite the persistent human rights arguments against sterilisation of women 
and girls with disability and a number of government reviews into sterilisation in 
Australia,3 non-consensual sterilisation of women and girls with disability is not 
prohibited. Instead, the practice is regulated. Where a woman or girl with 
disability is deemed to lack mental capacity to consent to medical procedures, 
non-consensual sterilisation can be lawful on two legal bases. One is that a third 
party (such as a parent or guardian) can provide their substituted consent to 
sterilisation of the woman or girl where this consent is authorised by a court or 
tribunal which determines that the procedure will be in the woman or girl’s best 
interests (‘court authorised sterilisation’). The second legal basis is that, pursuant 
to the defence of necessity, a medical practitioner can act without any consent 
(whether that of the individual herself or a third party) where there is an 
emergency situation which demands the sterilisation. Australia only criminalises 
(through general criminal laws of assault) sterilisation that is done without court 
authorised third party consent or that is not justified pursuant to the defence of 
necessity. Court authorised sterilisation is the focus of this article.  
In 2008, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (‘CRPD’) came into force and has reinforced the status of 
sterilisation as a violation of human rights of women and girls with disability 
(regardless of whether it has been court authorised) and has provided increased 
momentum towards prohibition at a domestic level of all non-consensual 
sterilisation of women and girls with disability except where there is a serious 
threat to life.4 As will be discussed, the effect of the CRPD is that third party 
consent should not prevent sterilisation from being viewed as violence and hence 
falling within the scope of the criminal offence of assault because the denial of 
the individual’s legal capacity and the reasons that courts authorise third party 
consent to sterilisation are grounded on discriminatory ideas about mental 
incapacity and disability more broadly. Court authorisation does not render 
sterilisation any less a violation and, in fact, court authorised sterilisation is 
particularly egregious because the judiciary’s role in permitting this procedure 
renders this sterilisation a form of state-sanctioned violence. The United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘UN Disability 
Committee’), the committee responsible for monitoring implementation of the 
CRPD, has urged states parties to ‘abolish policies and legislative provisions that 
allow or perpetrate forced treatment’ and has urged Australia to prohibit all non-
                                                                                                                         
relation to Australia, see, eg, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding 
Observations on the Initial Report of Australia, Adopted by the Committee at Its Tenth Session (2–13 
September 2013), UN Doc CRPD/C/AUS/CO/1 (21 October 2013) 5–6 [39]–[40] (‘Concluding 
Observations’); Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Australia, UN GAOR, 17th sess, Agenda Item 6, UN Doc A/HRC/17/10 (24 March 2011) 15 [86.39]; see 
also Frohmader and Sands, above n 1, 54–5 [206]–[210]. 
3  See government inquiries and reviews discussed in Malcolm Parker, ‘“Forced Sterilisation”: Clarifying 
and Challenging Intuitions and Models’ (2013) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 512, 512–18; Senate 
Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation 
of People with Disabilities in Australia (2013) 2–3 [1.8]–[1.12]. 
4  Opened for signature 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
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consensual sterilisation.5 Thus, the CRPD provides a persuasive and powerful 
argument for viewing all non-consensual sterilisation of women and girls with 
disability including court authorised sterilisation (except where there is a serious 
threat to life) as an act of discrimination and violence and as a serious violation 
of the human rights of women and girls with disability.  
Recently the Australian government, through the Senate Community Affairs 
Reference Committee (‘Senate Committee’), considered the issue of sterilisation, 
including by reference to the CRPD. In its 2013 report, Inquiry into the 
Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People with Disabilities in Australia6 
(‘Senate Committee Report’), the Senate Committee made recommendations 
which would (in its view) locate sterilisation in a human rights framework. It 
recommended retaining the practice of court authorised sterilisation but 
reforming the legal test that governs court authorisation: substituting the current 
‘best interests’ test with a ‘best protection of rights’ test.7 At face value the 
Senate Committee Report seems to be a significant step forward. Not only were 
human rights and the CRPD mentioned throughout the report, but the rights of 
women and girls with disability would now be ‘protected’ and specifically 
integrated into the legal framework of sterilisation. And yet, on closer 
consideration, the Senate Committee’s ‘human rights’ approach runs counter to 
the CRPD approach to sterilisation, particularly by reason of two factors: 
sterilisation was not abolished but merely regulated pursuant to a different (albeit 
purportedly human rights) legal test and the human right of equality and non-
discrimination was excluded from the rights which would be protected through 
the ‘best protection of rights’. The fact that the Senate Committee’s approach 
ultimately falls short of the CRPD is reflected in United Nations (‘UN’) human 
rights bodies’ reports to Australia subsequent to the Senate Committee Report. 
For example, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities stated 
it was ‘deeply concerned that the Senate inquiry report … puts forward 
recommendations that would allow this practice to continue’.8 It urged Australia 
to ‘adopt uniform national legislation prohibiting the sterilization of boys and 
girls with disabilities, and adults with disabilities, in the absence of their prior, 
fully informed and free consent’.9  
In this article, I illuminate the troubling logic of the Senate Committee’s 
approach to court authorised sterilisation and human rights. I do this by exploring 
how court authorised sterilisation can possibly be advanced as a means of 
protecting a woman or girl’s human rights while simultaneously not respecting 
the human right of equality and non-discrimination. I explore court authorised 
sterilisation specifically in relation to the legal framework applicable to girls with 
disability. The article focuses on girls because the domestic judicial decisions 
                                                 
5  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1: Article 12: Equal 
Recognition before the Law, 11th sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 (19 May 2014) 11 [42] (‘General 
Comment No 1’); Concluding Observations, UN Doc CRPD/C/AUS/CO/1, 5–6 [39]–[40]. 
6  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation, above n 3. 
7  Ibid x. 
8  Concluding Observations, UN Doc CRPD/C/AUS/CO/1, 5 [39]. 
9  Ibid 6 [40]. 
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relating to human rights and sterilisation which were central to the Senate 
Committee’s recommendations relate to girls, as opposed to women, and, 
secondly, the human rights issues are most apparent in relation to this group by 
reason of the young age of these girls and the unlikelihood that sterilisation 
would ever be contemplated let alone judicially sought for non-disabled females 
of the same age. Moreover, the article focuses specifically on court authorised 
sterilisation rather than also considering sterilisation justified pursuant to the 
defence of necessity, because the latter was not considered by the Senate 
Committee. However, sterilisation and the defence of necessity is an important 
site of analysis and some preliminary points of inquiry are noted below at Part 
III(B)(5). 
I analyse the Senate Committee Report by reference to critical disability 
studies scholarship. Critical disability studies scholars draw upon a range of 
disciplines and theoretical standpoints to analyse the social, political and cultural 
dimensions of disability as a form of difference. Critical disability studies 
scholars critique medical approaches to disability which are focused on disability 
as an individual, biomedical deficit.10 Instead they analyse disability as a socially 
produced abnormality which is in a mutually constitutive relationship to 
‘normality’.11 Importantly, the norms against which disability is constructed are 
not only norms of ability but social norms that sit at the intersection of multiple 
dimensions of difference including (relevantly for present purposes) ability, 
sexuality and gender.12 Critical disability studies scholars focus on illuminating 
and contesting the material, cultural and institutional ways through which 
disability as abnormality is produced, and the material, cultural and institutional 
effects of abnormality, including the greater legal permissibility of violence 
against people with disability.  
I argue that the Senate Committee’s approach to sterilisation and human 
rights, notably the retention of court authorised sterilisation and the ‘best 
protection of rights’ test, constructs girls with disability as abnormal and hence 
subject to a different and lower human rights threshold than girls without 
disability. In particular, their abnormality means their inequality is to be expected 
and they are incapable of being subjected to the process of comparison in order to 
determine whether or not they have been discriminated against. Court authorised 
sterilisation becomes ‘a-discriminatory’ – as incapable of ever possibly being 
contemplated as an act of discrimination. Moreover, court authorised sterilisation 
is a way to realise (other) human rights of girls with disability. Through my 
                                                 
10  Note, however, the argument by Helen Meekosha and Karen Soldatic about the possibility of the selective 
and strategic deployment of medicalised impairment in contesting oppression (although I argue that 
sterilisation is not such a means for the strategic deployment of medicalised impairment): Helen 
Meekosha and Karen Soldatic, ‘Human Rights and the Global South: The Case of Disability’ (2011) 32 
Third World Quarterly 1383. 
11  See, eg, Tanya Titchkosky and Rod Michalko, ‘Introduction’ in Tanya Titchkosky and Rod Michalko 
(eds), Rethinking Normalcy: A Reader (Canadian Scholars Press, 2009) 1.  
12  See, eg, Kim Q Hall, ‘Reimagining Disability and Gender through Feminist Disability Studies: An 
Introduction’ in Kim Q Hall (ed), Feminist Disability Studies (Indiana University Press, 2011); Margrit 
Shildrick, Dangerous Discourses of Disability, Subjectivity and Sexuality (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 
105. 
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analysis I argue that the Senate Committee cannot defend its recommendations 
on human rights grounds as they are not in conformity with the CRPD and the 
recommendations rely upon and themselves consolidate legal constructions of 
women and girls with disability that promote their discrimination and the 
enacting of lawful violence on their bodies. Ultimately I argue the Senate 
Committee’s recommendations should be rejected and attention should focus 
squarely on prohibiting sterilisation, not least of all because it is a form of state-
sanctioned and lawful discrimination and violence against women and girls with 
disability. 
Two years on from the Senate Committee Report, the Australian government 
is yet to act on the Report’s recommendations. Yet, it is timely to pause and give 
careful consideration to the Senate Committee’s approach to court authorised 
sterilisation and human rights for at least three reasons. One reason is that a 
recent report by the Senate Committee into violence, abuse and neglect of people 
with disability in institutional and residential settings has taken an approach to 
medical treatment of people with disability pursuant to substituted consent or 
‘disability specific interventions’ (of which court authorised sterilisation is one 
example) which is more in conformity with the CRPD.13 Disappointingly, the 
Senate Committee did not single out sterilisation for discussion: it is vital to 
ensure that court authorised sterilisation is explicitly included in all discussions 
about violence against people with disability (and is not forgotten in a focus on 
more gender-neutral medical interventions which might not require confronting 
society’s deeply-held prejudices about disabled women’s bodies and sexuality). 
The second reason is that in recent years, international pressure on the Australian 
government to prohibit court authorised sterilisation has intensified. Most 
recently, in November 2015 the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
‘raised concerns Australia is breaching the human rights of women with 
disabilities by allowing their forced sterilisation’. 14  The third reason is that 
violence against people with disability is currently being considered in a variety 
of other contexts including the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to 
Child Sexual Abuse15 and the safeguarding provisions of the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme.16 
I begin in Part II with an introduction to the Australian legal framework of 
court authorised sterilisation. In Part III, I identify two competing international 
human rights approaches to court authorised sterilisation, and discuss why one of 
                                                 
13  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Violence, Abuse and Neglect 
against People with Disability in Institutional and Residential Settings, including the Gender and Age 
Related Dimensions, and the Particular Situation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People with 
Disability, and Culturally and Linguistically Diverse People with Disability (2015) ch 4. There are only 
three mentions of sterilisation in the entire 343 page report, and these are only passing references.  
14  Bridie Jabour, ‘UN Examines Australia’s Forced Sterilisation of Women with Disabilities’, The Guardian 
(online), 10 November 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/nov/10/un-examines-
australias-forced-sterilisation-of-women-with-disabilities>. 
15  Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Redress and 
Civil Litigation Report (2015). 
16  National Disability Insurance Scheme, ‘Proposal for a National Disability Insurance Scheme Quality and 
Safeguarding Framework’ (Consultation Paper, February 2015). 
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these (that articulated by reference to the CRPD) is the legally and politically 
preferred approach. I then turn in Part IV(A) to introduce the Senate Committee 
Report. In Part IV(B) I analyse the Senate Committee’s approach to human rights 
in relation to the retention of court authorised sterilisation and then in Part IV(C) 
I analyse its approach to the legal test for court authorisation. I conclude with 
some broader discussion of the implications of my analysis for thinking about the 
relationship between disability, violence and human rights more broadly.  
 
II   COURT AUTHORISED STERILISATION 
In the seminal High Court decision of Secretary, Department of Health and 
Community Services v JWB (‘Marion’s Case’),17 the majority held that parental 
or guardian consent to sterilisation of a girl with disability who herself does not 
have the legal capacity to consent is sufficient to render the physical contact to 
the girl’s body lawful.18 The majority articulated a bifurcated system depending 
on whether the sterilisation is for ‘therapeutic’ or ‘non-therapeutic’ purposes.19 
When the sterilisation of a girl with disability without her consent is necessary to 
save the girl’s life or to prevent serious damage to her health (‘therapeutic 
sterilisation’), this sterilisation is lawful pursuant to the combined effect of the 
tort and criminal law defences of consent and substituted decision-making laws 
which recognise the legality of third party consent in these circumstances.20 No 
court authorisation is required. An example of therapeutic sterilisation is to 
address a life threatening cancer, which could not be mitigated by less invasive 
means. While there are certainly issues related to how ‘therapeutic’ is defined,21 
particularly in a broader context of the significance of the medicalisation of 
disability generally to the expansive rationalisation of non-consensual medical 
interventions on the basis of therapeutic benefit,22 these issues are not the focus of 
this article (although they are taken up briefly in a discussion of the doctrine of 
necessity below). However, it is important to note here that the focus in this 
article on ‘non-therapeutic’ sterilisation is because the article is about court 
authorised sterilisation and this legal mode of sterilisation applies only to ‘non-
therapeutic’ sterilisation. Yet, as is clear throughout the article, and notably in 
                                                 
17  (1992) 175 CLR 218. 
18  Ibid 235 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
19  Ibid 250 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
20  For a general discussion, see Linda Steele, ‘Disability, Abnormality and Criminal Law: Sterilisation as 
Lawful and Good Violence’ (2014) 23 Griffith Law Review 467. 
21  On ‘therapeutic’ sterilisation, see, eg, Lesley Naik, ‘When is the Sterilisation of an Intellectually Disabled 
Child “Therapeutic”? A Practical Analysis of the Legal Requirement to Seek Court Authorisation’ (2012) 
20 Journal of Law and Medicine 453; Joshua Shaw, ‘De-Recognition of Disability: Canadian Parens 
Patriae Jurisdiction and Sterilization’ (2015) 36 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 147; Linda 
Steele, ‘Making Sense of the Family Court’s Decisions on the Non-Therapeutic Sterilisation of Girls with 
Intellectual Disability’ (2008) 22 Australian Journal of Family Law 1. 
22  Linda Steele and Leanne Dowse, ‘Gender, Disability Rights and Violence against Medical Bodies’ (2016) 
(forthcoming) Australian Feminist Studies. 
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Part III(B)(5), the author is critical of the division itself and the expansive notion 
of ‘therapeutic’ as it applies to people with disability. 
Where the sterilisation of a girl with disability is for ‘non-therapeutic’ 
purposes parental consent must be additionally authorised by the Family Court 
pursuant to its welfare jurisdiction (now in section 67ZC of the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth)), because parental consent to sterilisation in these circumstances falls 
outside of the scope of parental authority.23 The Family Court can only authorise 
parental consent to sterilisation where there are no less invasive alternatives and 
it is in the best interests of the child.24 Through the ‘best interests’ test the Court 
asks: is the sterilisation in the best interests of the individual who is to be 
sterilised (as against the best interests of a third party or society at large)? As the 
majority in Marion’s Case state: ‘if authorization is given, it will not be on 
account of the convenience of sterilization as a contraceptive measure, but 
because it is necessary to enable her to lead a life in keeping with her needs and 
capacities’. 25  Importantly, sterilisation which is authorised under the Family 
Court’s welfare jurisdiction relates to sterilisation which is by very definition not 
‘therapeutic’, that is, is not necessary to save the girl’s life or to prevent serious 
damage to her health, but is nevertheless required for some other reason still 
considered to be in the girl’s ‘best interests’. As I have discussed at length 
elsewhere, court authorised sterilisation fits within a division of legal subjects in 
terms of mental capacity and incapacity which results in different thresholds of 
unlawful and lawful violence for people with and without mental capacity and 
hence differences in what constitutes the criminal offence of assault.26 Pursuant to 
this division, women and girls with disability are subject to a lower threshold of 
unlawful violence meaning that court authorised sterilisation is permissible and, 
indeed, necessary and is thus a lawful or ‘good’ form of violence. At the heart of 
the legal status of court authorised sterilisation as ‘lawful violence’ is the idea of 
women and girls with disability as ‘abnormal’ which thus renders their 
differential treatment irrelevant. In this article I build on these arguments by 
exploring court authorised sterilisation at the nexus of domestic law reform and 
international human rights law. 
When the current legal framework for sterilisation was articulated in the early 
1990s in Marion’s Case, the majority was of the view that the human rights of 
girls with intellectual disability would be protected through judicial oversight of 
court authorisation and the ‘best interests’ test moderating such authorisation. 
This was on the basis that girls with mental incapacity could not consent and so 
their right to bodily integrity could only be realised through others giving 
substituted consent on their behalf, with judicial oversight protecting the 
individual against abuse of third party consent. Here the underlying assumption 
was that the human rights issue in court authorised sterilisation was the 
procedural question of consent. The subject matter of the decision whether or not 
to consent – the act of sterilisation itself – was not itself a violation of human 
                                                 
23  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 249 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
24  Ibid 259–60 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
25  Ibid 260 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
26  Steele, ‘Disability, Abnormality and Criminal Law’, above n 20. See also Steele and Dowse, above n 22. 
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rights. This approach accepted the division of individuals in law on the basis of 
mental capacity, and did not see anything wrong with this division itself or the 
subsequent inequality between these groups – a point I will explain in greater 
detail in Part III below. 
In the subsequent 1995 decision of P v P,27 the Full Family Court considered 
in greater detail the legal test for court authorisation. The Court considered 
whether the best interests test should include reference to non-discrimination in 
the form of a ‘but for’ question (‘but for the disability, would this girl be 
sterilised?’). It is necessary here to provide some background to this decision, as 
this decision was central to the Senate Committee Report and I revisit it in some 
detail in Part IV(C). P v P was an appeal decision of the Full Court of the Family 
Court decided in 1995. The initial decision which was the subject of the appeal in 
P v P concerned an application made by the mother of ‘Lessli’ to the Family 
Court for authorisation of her consent to Lessli’s hysterectomy. At the time of the 
initial application for court authorisation Lessli was aged 16 years. Lessli was 
described as having temporal lobe epilepsy and low-moderate range intellectual 
disability and, additionally, as having obsessive behaviours, wandering habits, 
underdeveloped basic living skills, and poor social skills. Lessli lived in 
residential accommodation during the school week and spent the weekends with 
her mother (her parents were divorced). She was due to complete her schooling 
the following year, at which point she would return to living with her mother 
who would leave her employment to become her full-time carer. 28  Lessli’s 
mother sought Family Court authorisation for her consent to sterilisation on two 
key grounds. One ground was to prevent menstruation. Lessli became aggressive 
and upset when menstruating. She had frequent (twice per month) and heavy 
menstruation and had problems with hygiene related to her menstruation (she did 
not always wear pads and required prompting to change pads). Her mother 
argued Lessli had to be reminded to change her pad and would show people the 
pad.29 The other ground was to prevent pregnancy. Lessli had little concept of 
personal safety and social boundaries, she was incapable of consenting to sexual 
intercourse such that any sex with her would constitute sexual assault and she 
had previously been sexually assaulted while living in the group home. There 
was a risk of seizures and general confusion in pregnancy, as well as concern that 
Lessli would be unable to care for a child. Also, there was apparently a risk of 
any baby being born to Lessli being born with ‘incapacities’, although this was 
not elaborated on.30  
The application for authorisation of sterilisation of Lessli was dismissed at 
first instance.31 Justice Moore applied the discrimination ‘but for’ test that is 
                                                 
27  (1995) 126 FLR 245. 
28  Ibid 249–53 (The Court). 
29  Ibid 252–4 (The Court). It should be noted that while the application for consent was brought by Lessli’s 
mother, generally the school (which also provided to the Court observations of her capabilities) gave a 
more supportive and positive account of Lessli’s skills and her ability to cope with menstruation: at 250–
1 (The Court). 
30  Ibid 254–5 (The Court). 
31  Ibid 245 (The Court). 
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‘sterilisation should not be approved if it would not be contemplated in the case 
of an intellectually normal girl with similar epilepsy’.32 So, at first instance, the 
question of discrimination was central to the decision not to authorise  
Lessli’s mother’s consent to the sterilisation. Lessli’s mother then appealed this 
decision to the Full Family Court. Ultimately, the appeal was allowed and the 
mother’s consent to sterilisation was authorised by the Court. The Full Family 
Court was of the view that Moore J was wrong in applying a ‘but for’ test. 
Rather, the judge should have applied the ‘best interests’ test as set out in 
Marion’s Case. The Court dismissed the argument that discrimination is relevant 
to court authorisation, stating that the application of a ‘but for’ test might be 
‘superficially attractive’ because it ‘is non-discriminatory and equates the 
intellectually handicapped person with the non-intellectually handicapped’, but 
ultimately the test has the opposite effect and is ‘conceptually incorrect’.33 So, 
while the paramount consideration as per Marion’s Case is always the best 
interests of the child, following P v P in determining what is in a particular girl’s 
best interests consideration cannot extend to the question of discrimination.  
I will return to P v P in Part IV(C) below. For present purposes, two points 
are relevant which I will develop in the rest of the article. One is that the effect of 
the exclusion of the ‘but for’ question from the legal test for court authorisation 
was to deem the right to equality and non-discrimination irrelevant to the 
individual judicial determination of court authorisation. The other is that, 
building on the division between mental capacity and incapacity in Marion’s 
Case, the court decided that the ‘but for’ test was not relevant because these girls 
were so different as to be unequal and incomparable to girls without intellectual 
disability.  
 
III   DISABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
It may be apparent from my introductory discussion of the CRPD approach to 
sterilisation and the Australian judicial approach to court authorised sterilisation 
that there are two seemingly competing human rights approaches to court 
authorised sterilisation and specifically to the idea of equality. I now explore 
these two approaches, beginning with the earlier ‘mental incapacity human rights 
approach’ (reflected in the Australian judicial approach to sterilisation, and more 
recently in the Senate Report) and followed by the current CRPD ‘legal capacity 
human rights approach’ (reflected in the disability rights opposition to court 
authorised sterilisation). I will focus on showing how these two approaches 
diverge in relation to their vantage point for considering human rights. The legal 
capacity human rights approach views the substance of court authorised 
sterilisation as a violation of human rights, whereas the (earlier) mental 
incapacity human rights approach views the failure to follow procedure for 
consenting to court authorised sterilisation as a violation of human rights. These 
                                                 
32  Ibid 266 (The Court). 
33  Ibid 266–8 (The Court). 
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two approaches have a fundamental difference in relation to disability and 
equality. The mental incapacity approach sees people with disability as 
inherently different to people without disability such that inequality between 
these groups is assumed and they are subject to a different set of human rights. 
The legal capacity approach sees people with disability as equal to others and 
demands equality between people with disability and those without, in turn 
demanding the same human rights should be enjoyed by all. In the parts that 
follow, I argue that it is the tension between these approaches, and the Senate 
Committee’s preference for the earlier mental incapacity human rights approach 
(confusingly presented as a CRPD approach), which is at the heart of the Senate 
Committee’s deliberations on sterilisation and human rights. This renders its 
recommendations particularly concerning.  
 
A   Mental Incapacity and the Historical Ambivalence of International 
Human Rights Law towards Court Authorised Sterilisation 
The human rights arguments against court authorised sterilisation were 
always defensible by drawing on mainstream international human rights 
instruments. However, prior to the introduction of the CRPD the arguments 
against court authorised sterilisation were arguably obfuscated by prevailing 
approaches to human rights of people with disability which positioned them as 
legitimately ‘unequal’ to people with disability by reason of mental incapacity. 
These prevailing approaches are reflected in what I refer to as the ‘mental 
incapacity human rights approach’ to sterilisation. 
Historically, people with disability have been subject to lower human rights 
thresholds by reason of their marginalisation in mainstream international human 
rights instruments and the existence of disability-specific international human 
rights instruments. As Frédéric Mégret states:  
For a long time, some persons with disabilities were hardly considered human and 
were, as a result, denied basic rights ... Persons with disabilities have been victims 
of genocide, eugenism, and have suffered from massive discrimination resulting 
from a denial of their basic rights.34 
Mainstream human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights35 enshrine the right to equality and non-discrimination 
and hence in theory provide that all individuals should enjoy all human rights 
regardless of disability. Yet scholars have argued that ‘their marginalised and dis-
empowered social and political status’ meant that people with disability 
historically did not ‘enjoy the benefits of their human rights’ under mainstream 
human rights instruments.36 Adam McBeth, Justine Nolan and Simon Rice note 
‘a pattern of omissions’ of disability in (mainstream) human rights instruments 
                                                 
34  Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability 
Rights?’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 494, 500 (citations omitted). See also Rosemary Kayess and 
Phillip French, ‘Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 1, 12–17. 
35  Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR’). 
36  Adam McBeth, Justine Nolan and Simon Rice, The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 480. 
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prior to the CRPD.37 The marginal status of people with disability is evident in 
the texts of general human rights instruments which do not explicitly identify 
disability as a basis for discrimination: ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status’.38 While disability has been interpreted as falling under ‘other status’,39 the 
absence of an explicit mention in the treaties themselves is notable.40 Division of 
human rights subjects on the basis of mental capacity and incapacity was routine 
and differential treatment through the denial of legal capacity on the basis of 
mental incapacity and regimes for substituted decision-making were considered 
permissible under general international human rights instruments. For individuals 
with mental incapacity the focus was on ensuring procedural safeguards through 
which denial of legal capacity and substituted decision-making occurred. At this 
time, human rights had less (or nothing) to say about the substance of what could 
be done pursuant to substituted decision-making. 
The marginal status of people with disability in international human  
rights law was compounded by specialist disability human rights instruments41 
which were based on problematic assumptions about people with disability. 
These instruments focused on a medical approach to disability and provided  
for a lower threshold of human rights. For example, the Declaration on the 
Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons provided that: ‘[t]he mentally retarded 
person has, to the maximum degree of feasibility, the same rights as other  
human beings’.42 These instruments took a paternalistic approach to rights which 
legitimised differential treatment (particularly on the basis of mental incapacity) 
including segregation, restraint, institutionalisation and non-consensual  
medical treatment.43 Like the approach to people with disability in mainstream 
international human rights instruments, these disability-specific instruments 
explicitly provided for substituted decision-making and focused on ‘procedural 
safeguards’.44 
                                                 
37  Ibid. See also Piers Gooding, ‘Change and Continuity in Mental Health Law: The Long Road to the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Implications for Mental 
Health and the Law Today’ (2014) 20(3) Web European Journal of Current Legal Issues 
<http://webjcli.org/article/view/367/470>. 
38  See, eg, ICCPR art 2(1). 
39  McBeth, Nolan and Rice, above n 36, 479, quoting Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No 5: Persons with Disabilities, UN ESCOR, 11th sess, 38th mtg, Supp No 3, UN Doc 
E/1995/22 (25 November 1994) [5]. 
40  Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention’, above n 34, 502. 
41  See, eg, Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, GA Res 2856 (XXVI), UN GAOR, 26th 
sess, 2027th plen mtg, Agenda Item 12, UN Doc A/RES/26/2856 (20 December 1971) (‘Declaration on 
the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons’); Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, GA Res 3447 
(XXX), UN GAOR, 13th sess, 2433rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/30/3447 (9 December 1975); Principles 
for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, GA Res 
46/119, UN GAOR, 46th sess, 75th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/46/119 (17 December 1991). 
42  Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, UN Doc A/RES/26/2856, art 1 (emphasis 
added). 
43  See, eg, Gooding, above n 37; McBeth, Nolan and Rice, above n 36, 477–9. 
44  For example, art 7 of the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, UN Doc 
A/RES/26/2856 provided that: 
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It is well-established in the scholarship that the earlier human rights approach 
reflects a medical model of disability that denied people with disabilities full 
access to human rights (indeed, this is routinely recognised as one of the core 
reasons for the CRPD, which I will discuss shortly).45 This medical approach to 
disability saw individuals as naturally (in the double sense of biomedically and 
self-evidently) different and subject to lower human rights thresholds which 
rendered this violence permissible, a point I will return to below. The mental 
incapacity human rights approach organised the subjects of human rights by 
reference to mental capacity and incapacity, and attributed differential human 
rights thresholds on this basis. Similar to the role of criminal law and tort law (in 
the domestic context), human rights (in the international context) set differential 
thresholds for unlawful violence by reference to mental capacity. Notably, this 
approach did not see as violence medical interventions such as sterilisation, 
restrictive practices and forced psychiatric treatment. The implicit status of 
violence in the mental incapacity approach to human rights reflects the cultural 
role of human rights law in defining what it means to be ‘human’.46 In organising 
individuals within and outside of full humanness, human rights have significant 
impacts on the material violence individuals can be lawfully subjected to.47 The 
cultural role of human rights might be an example of Judith Butler’s notion of 
‘derealization’. ‘Derealization’ is a process whereby certain lives are discursively 
denied the status of a life worth grieving in their subjection to physical violence 
or even death because they do not fit within the ‘dominant frame for the 
human’.48 ‘Derealization’ results in their dehumanisation which ‘then gives rise 
to a physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization 
that is already at work in the culture’.49  
By reason of their positioning outside the full, capable ‘human’ of human 
rights, people with disability are outside of the community of humans (‘common 
humanity’) of human rights law and in turn beyond comparison to these ‘equal’, 
mentally capable humans for the purpose of determining discrimination and 
realising equality. This exclusion from common humanity is important because 
discrimination is premised on the fundamental equality of all humans, as 
                                                                                                                         
Whenever mentally retarded persons are unable, because of the severity of their handicap, to exercise all 
their rights in a meaningful way or it should become necessary to restrict or deny some or all of these 
rights, the procedure used for that restriction or denial of rights must contain proper legal safeguards 
against every form of abuse. This procedure must be based on an evaluation of the social capability of the 
mentally retarded person by qualified experts and must be subject to periodic review and to the right of 
appeal to higher authorities. 
45  See, eg, McBeth, Nolan and Rice, above n 36, 480. 
46  See, eg, in the context of disability: Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic 
Concept of Rights’ (2008) 12 The International Journal of Human Rights 261, 262. See generally Anna 
Grear, ‘“Framing the Project” of International Human Rights Law: Reflections on the Dysfunctional 
“Family” of the Universal Declaration’ in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 17. 
47  For an exploration of human rights and torture against people with disability see, eg, in the context of 
torture: Dinesh Wadiwel, ‘Black Sites: Disability and Torture’ (2017) (forthcoming) Continuum: Journal 
of Media and Cultural Studies. 
48  Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Verso, 2004) 34. 
49  Ibid. 
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members of a shared community. It is this fundamental sameness of members of 
a shared community that then enables comparison between groups of humans 
within this community despite differential characteristics between groups 
because these differential characteristics are viewed as superficial to the equal 
cores of all humans across these groups. Historically, non-discrimination and 
inequality vis-à-vis people without disability were not relevant to the rights 
threshold for people with disability because people with disability were seen as 
unequal by reason of their disability and rather than being viewed as a superficial 
characteristic their disability was a ‘synecdoche’ 50  for the individual and 
‘embedded in the very fabric of their physical and moral [or, in this case, legal] 
personhood’.51 As such, they were fundamentally unequal and thus outside of the 
community of humans and beyond comparison to people without disability for 
the purposes of discrimination. 
Thus, through the division of human rights subjects on the basis of mental 
capacity and incapacity, human rights accommodated and, in fact, were premised 
upon the differential and discriminatory treatment of people with mental 
incapacity. At the same time, inequality and discrimination against people with 
disability through the historical ordering of international human rights law on the 
basis of mental capacity was not evident because the biomedical, internal, 
scientific psychological characteristic of disability made the mental capacity 
division seem like a self-evident (rather than political) contouring of human 
rights law.  
Ultimately, the medical approach to disability resulted in an ambivalence in 
the interpretation and application of international human rights instruments 
towards acts done pursuant to substituted decision-making, with the focus being 
on procedural safeguards in the court authorisation rather than a focus on the 
actual substance of the court authorisation itself. This approach could not 
conceive of sterilisation as an act of violence – instead it was necessary medical 
treatment.  
This ‘mental incapacity human rights approach’ is evident in the legal 
framework for sterilisation as per Marion’s Case. In reaching its decision, the 
majority in Marion’s Case considered the human rights arguments against court 
authorised sterilisation. The majority’s discussion of human rights focused on the 
right to personal inviolability.52 While the right to personal inviolability would 
typically be realised by ensuring individual autonomy over physical interventions 
to one’s body, in relation to girls with mental incapacity the right was upheld by 
withdrawing the ability to consent and substituting this consent with that of a 
third party who would act in their ‘best interests’. Judicial oversight of this 
substituted decision-making was considered sufficient to protect the specific 
                                                 
50  Catherine Mills, Futures of Reproduction: Bioethics and Biopolitics (Springer, 2011) 71 n 48. 
51  David T Mitchell and Sharon L Snyder, ‘Introduction: Disability Studies and the Double Bind of 
Representation’ in David T Mitchell and Sharon L Snyder (eds), The Body and Physical Difference: 
Discourses of Disability (University of Michigan Press, 1997) 1, 3, citing Robert Murphy, ‘Encounters: 
The Body Silent in America’ in Benedicte Ingstad and Susan Reynolds Whyte (eds), Disability and 
Culture (University of California Press, 1995) 140–58. 
52  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 253–4 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
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human right of personal inviolability of girls with disability.53 So, while non-
consensual sterilisation of an individual with mental capacity would be a 
violation of human rights, mental incapacity resulted in a lower human rights 
threshold which itself permitted non-consensual sterilisation (via substituted 
decision-making) as the very means for realising an individual’s human rights. In 
comparison to this approach, Brennan J, in the minority, was of the view that 
non-therapeutic sterilisation would be a violation of a child’s human right to 
bodily inviolability.54 While Justice Brennan’s view was in the minority, his view 
highlights that, even in the judicial decision establishing the legal framework for 
court authorised sterilisation of girls with intellectual disability, there were 
conflicting ideas of the relationship between sterilisation and human rights.  
 
B   Legal Capacity and the Contemporary Human Rights Approach to 
Sterilisation as Discriminatory Violence 
The marginal status of people with disability in international human rights 
law and, in turn, the ambivalent status of court authorised sterilisation as a human 
rights violation, has been challenged through the coming into force in 2008 of  
the CRPD.55 The CRPD is premised on a ‘concern’ that ‘despite [mainstream 
international human rights instruments] persons with disabilities continue to face 
barriers in their participation as equal members of society and violations of their 
human rights in all parts of the world’.56 The CRPD does not introduce any new 
human rights for persons with disabilities but instead aims to enhance recognition 
of existing human rights in relation to persons with disability. For present 
purposes, the CRPD achieves this in at least four ways. 
 
1 Alternative Conceptualisation of Disability 
A fundamental shift brought about by the CRPD is the redefinition of 
disability as a fluid, socially contingent concept thus challenging the pervasive 
medical approach to disability in the earlier mental incapacity human rights 
approach.57 This shift demonstrates that disability is not an objective and fixed 
concept in international human rights law but can be framed in different ways. 
The CRPD provides a space in international human rights law to question how 
disability has historically been understood in international human rights law (and 
                                                 
53  Ibid 259–60 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
54  Ibid 265–9 (Brennan J). 
55  For a history of the development of the CRPD, see, eg, Kayess and French, above n 34; Anna Lawson, 
‘The United Nations and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: New Era or False 
Dawn?’ (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 563; McBeth, Nolan and Rice, 
above n 36; Michael Ashley Stein and Janet E Lord, ‘Monitoring the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: Innovations, Lost Opportunities, and Future Potential’ (2010) 32 Human Rights 
Quarterly 689. For a detailed discussion of the development of art 12, see Amita Dhanda, ‘Legal 
Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future?’ (2007) 
34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 429, 438–56. 
56  CRPD Preamble para k. 
57  See, eg, Maya Sabatello and Marianne Schulze, ‘A Short History of the International Disability Rights 
Movement’ in Maya Sabatello and Marianne Schulze (eds), Human Rights and Disability Advocacy 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014) 1, 15–20. 
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in domestic legal systems and society more broadly), and to identify this as itself 
central to the ultimate realisation of all human rights of people with disability. 
What this shift demonstrates is that there is not one constant, a priori disabled 
subject of human rights which persists across time and across the introduction of 
the CRPD. The cultural paradigm shift affected by the CRPD results in a 
different conceptualisation of the disabled subject of human rights (and in turn, 
arguably, the ‘human’ of human rights58) which is fundamentally irreconcilable 
with the earlier mental incapacity approach to the disabled human rights subject, 
and it is from this core conception of the disabled subject that different 
interpretations of human rights and sterilisation flow. 
The CRPD – beyond (and inextricably related to) what it says about 
substantive human rights – affects a cultural shift which provides new 
possibilities for domestic law makers and society more broadly to see disability 
in different ways. Moreover, as will become apparent below, in seeing disability 
differently, it is possible to see new forms of violence against people with 
disability (previously taken for granted as necessary and benevolent medical 
treatment) by reason of the critique of the medicalisation of disability.59 This 
cultural shift then underpins the approach to substantive rights in the Convention 
and the status of court authorised sterilisation as a violation of human rights. 
 
2 Centrality of Equality and Non-discrimination 
The CRPD emphasises non-discrimination and equality, both as a right in 
itself60 and a general principle governing its operation as a whole.61 Article 2 of 
the CRPD defines ‘discrimination’ as ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction on 
the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’.62 The CRPD demands that individuals 
with disability be compared to individuals without disability and in turn that 
individuals with disability have the same rights thresholds as other individuals. 
The interdependency and interconnectedness of all rights in the CRPD, coupled 
with the permeation of equality throughout the Convention,63 means that states 
parties cannot pick and choose human rights if this will result in discrimination 
                                                 
58  Gerard Quinn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘Restoring the “Human” in “Human Rights”: Personhood and 
Doctrinal Innovation in the UN Disability Convention’ in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), The 
Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 36. 
59  While beyond the scope of this article, the shift affected by the CRPD suggests the co-construction of 
disability, human and violence under human rights law. On the co-constitution of the human and 
disability (but not also violence), see ibid; Tanya Titchkosky, ‘Monitoring Disability: The Question of the 
“Human” in Human Rights Projects’ in Michael Gill and Cathy J Schlund-Vials (eds), Disability, Human 
Rights and the Limits of Humanitarianism (Ashgate, 2014) 119. See also Judith Butler’s discussion of the 
co-construction of the human and violence (albeit with the notable omission of discussion of disability): 
Butler, above n 48, ch 2. 
60  CRPD art 5. 
61  CRPD Preamble, art 3(b). 
62  CRPD art 2. 
63  Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention’, above n 34, 501. 
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and inequality. This is particularly true for the right to legal capacity, as I discuss 
in the following section. 
The centrality of the right to equality and non-discrimination in the CRPD is 
supported by the approach to these same rights in international human rights law 
more broadly.64 Equality and non-discrimination is enshrined as a guarantee in 
the realisation of other human rights.65 This latter aspect is particularly important 
if an individual belongs to a group which is typically marginalised.66 McBeth, 
Nolan and Rice suggest that ‘[t]he principle of non-discrimination reflects the 
very essence of human rights, in that every person holds the same rights by virtue 
of being born human and not by virtue of some particular characteristic or 
membership of some particular social group’.67 Therefore, while there might not 
be a formal legal hierarchy of human rights that places non-discrimination at its 
peak and privileges its recognition over other rights, international human rights 
law makes clear that in practice for other rights to be recognised in a meaningful 
way and with the same outcomes as per their application to people without a 
disability, these rights must be applied in conjunction with the right to equality 
and non-discrimination. Therefore, different human rights thresholds of people 
with disability, even on the basis of ‘protection’, can no longer be sustained: non-
discrimination and equality are central to all human rights and cannot be ignored 
by prioritising other rights. This is a point I will further develop when discussing 
the Senate Report. This is a striking difference to the pre-CRPD mental 
incapacity approach to human rights where human rights were premised on an 
assumption of absolute difference and on the legitimacy of inequality. 
 
3 Right to Legal Capacity for All 
The CRPD also challenges the way in which perceived mental incapacity 
results in denial of legal capacity.68 Article 12 of the CRPD provides ‘the right to 
recognition everywhere as persons before the law’ and that ‘persons with 
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of 
life’.69 The UN Disability Committee in its General Comment dealing with article 
12 released on 11 April 2014 emphasises that legal capacity is distinct from 
mental capacity.70 The UN Disability Committee notes that in most countries law 
conflates the two concepts, so that a person is denied legal capacity where they 
                                                 
64  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN 
Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) arts 1, 2(1), 7; ICCPR arts 2, 3, 26; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 3 January 1976) arts 2(2), 3. 
65  For example, art 3 of the ICCPR states: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure 
the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present 
Covenant.’ 
66  Daniel Moeckli, ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh 
Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2014) 157, 160. 
67  McBeth, Nolan and Rice, above n 36, 111. 
68  ‘Legal capacity’ is the basis for recognising an individual as a person before the law and specifically 
consists of ‘the ability to hold rights and duties (legal standing) and to exercise those rights and duties 
(legal agency)’: General Comment No 1, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1, 3 [13]. 
69  CRPD arts 12(1)–(2). 
70  General Comment No 1, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1. 
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are considered to have impaired decision-making skills. In drawing on the right 
to equality and non-discrimination, the UN Disability Committee urges states 
parties to abolish substitute decision-making regimes in order to ensure that full 
legal capacity is restored to persons with disabilities on an equal basis with 
others.71 Significantly (on a conceptual level), the CRPD collapses the division of 
legal subjects on the basis of capacity and incapacity, grouping people with 
disability in the group of ‘common humanity’ and thus makes discrimination 
against people with disability conceivable. 
 
4 Legal Capacity and Violence 
Article 16 of the CRPD provides the right to freedom from exploitation, 
violence and abuse. Following the CRPD, the continuation of practices that deny 
legal capacity, including substituted decision-making, are discriminatory, and 
physical interventions (including medical procedures) done pursuant to 
substituted decision-making are discriminatory acts of violence. Furthermore, by 
reason of the discriminatory nature of the denial of legal capacity (and the 
discriminatory reasons for some medical treatment exclusively or primarily done 
to people with disability) this violence can also amount to torture.72  Judicial 
oversight in court authorisation in such circumstances is not protective – it is part 
of what renders such acts discriminatory, and in turn even torture, because the 
role of the judiciary renders this state-sanctioned violence.73  
The Disability Committee has explicitly labelled as discrimination and 
violence medical procedures (including sterilisation) done without the consent of 
individuals with disability, thus challenging the assumption that physical acts 
done to disabled bodies for medical purposes are inherently benevolent and  
the antithesis of violence.74 The Committee has stated that ‘States parties must 
abolish policies and legislative provisions that allow or perpetrate forced 
                                                 
71  Ibid 6–7 [24]–[29]. The issue of whether art 12 requires the replacement of all substituted decision-
making with supported decision-making regimes is highly contentious. For an overview of some of the 
issues, see Peter Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Mental Health Law’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 752; Dhanda, above n 55; Piers Gooding, ‘Supported 
Decision-Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its Implications for Mental Health Law’ 
(2013) 20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 431; Tina Minkowitz, ‘The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to be Free from Nonconsensual Psychiatric 
Interventions’ (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 405. 
72  See, eg, in the context of torture: Wadiwel, above n 47. 
73  For a discussion of violence and medical treatment, see Bernadette McSherry and Piers Gooding, 
‘Torture and Ill-Treatment in Health Care Settings: Lessons from the United Nations’ (2013) 20 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 712; Minkowitz, ‘Nonconsentual Psychiatric Interventions’, above n 71; Tina 
Minkowitz, ‘Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities’ in Bernadette McSherry and Penelope Weller (eds), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental 
Health Laws (Hart Publishing, 2010) 151. 
74  The UN Disability Committee has explicitly stated that:  
forced treatment by psychiatric and other health and medical professionals is a violation of the right to 
equal recognition before the law and an infringement of the rights to personal integrity (art. 17); freedom 
from torture (art. 15); and freedom from violence, exploitation and abuse (art. 16). This practice denies 
the legal capacity of a person to choose medical treatment and is therefore a violation of article 12 of the 
Convention 
  General Comment No 1, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 11 [42]. 
2016 Court Authorised Sterilisation and Human Rights 1019
treatment’ and recommends ‘that States parties ensure that decisions relating to a 
person’s physical or mental integrity can only be taken with the free and 
informed consent of the person concerned’.75 
 
5 Court Authorised Sterilisation as Discriminatory Violence 
The implications of the Disability Convention for court authorised 
sterilisation are a shift from concern about the procedure (ie, judicial oversight) 
of sterilisation to a fundamental concern with the act of sterilisation itself which 
in turn renders all court authorised sterilisation a human rights violation and any 
judicial oversight of sterilisation additionally problematic rather than protective. 
It is the legal capacity human rights approach which is the basis for disability 
rights advocates arguing for the prohibition of all forms of sterilisation against 
women and girls with disability, except where there is serious threat to life.  
It might be argued that denying access to sterilisation for people with 
disability is discriminatory because this could then put women and girls with 
disability at disadvantage in relation to their lifestyle or their health. 76  This 
argument is problematic for a number of reasons. First, in relation to ‘lifestyle’ 
sterilisation, while women without disability might seek sterilisation for matters 
related to life plan, lifestyle and family planning, these are not the reasons 
described in the cases relating to others deciding to the sterilisation of women 
and girls with disability.77 As discussed below in Part IV(C)(2), sterilisation of 
women and girls with disability further limits their ability to experience the 
‘lifestyles’ and life courses of women without disability. Secondly, caution must 
be exercised in supporting a space for ‘therapeutic’ sterilisation in health 
emergencies ‘equal’ to women without disability. This is because notions of 
emergency are interpreted differently in light of disability. In the leading 
necessity decision of Re F78 (which concerned whether the defence of necessity 
could justify the sterilisation of an adult woman with mental illness) Lord Goff 
provided two contrasting examples of the application of the defence of necessity: 
an unconscious and injured (but otherwise usually mentally capable) passenger 
who is treated by doctors after a train accident and a mentally disordered person 
who is disabled from giving consent. Lord Goff characterises the former as ‘an 
emergency’ and the latter as ‘a permanent or semi-permanent state of affairs’. 
His Lordship explained that:  
the permanent state of affairs calls for a wider range of care than may be requisite 
in an emergency which arises from accidental injury. When the state of affairs is 
permanent, or semi-permanent, action properly taken to preserve the life, health or 
well-being of the assisted person may well transcend such measures as surgical 
operation or substantial medical treatment and may extend to include such 
                                                 
75  Ibid. 
76  See, eg, Catherine Carroll and Gemma McGrath, ‘Intellectual Disability and the Right to Family Life: 
Equality Under the Law’ [2014] (122) Precedent 10, 12–13. 
77  For example, one can compare the factual circumstances surrounding the consensual sterilisations of 
abled women giving rise to wrongful birth litigation in tort law with the factual circumstances of the cases 
discussed in this article concerning non-consensual sterilisation of women with disability: see, eg, 
Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1. 
78  [1990] 2 AC 1. 
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humdrum matters as routine medical or dental treatment, even simple care such as 
dressing and undressing and putting to bed.79 
Lord Goff’s division of legal subjects of necessity indicates different 
thresholds of permissible violence by reason of the relationship between 
emergency and dis/ability. This manifests in terms of the kinds of procedures (the 
temporarily incapable – only what is immediately necessary; the permanently 
incapable – anything from the extreme to the mundane); different localities of 
emergency (the temporarily incapable – in the surrounding environmental 
circumstances, such as a car accident, or bodily circumstances, such as a transient 
health problem; in the permanently incapable – in their very disabled existence 
and disabled self) and different temporalities (the temporarily incapable – only 
what is immediately required; the permanently incapable – ongoing 
interventions). Thus, arguing for ‘equal’ access for women with disability to 
sterilisation in relation to emergency medical situations needs to be carefully 
considered because currently, the law views that a woman with disability’s life is 
at serious threat by the very reason of her disability.  
 
6 Can We Choose? The Priority of the Legal Capacity Human Rights 
Approach 
I have outlined above two alternative human rights approaches to 
sterilisation: one that supports legal regulation of sterilisation where a particular 
procedure of court authorisation is met (mental incapacity human rights 
approach) and the other that supports the prohibition of sterilisation even if (and 
additionally because) it is court authorised (legal capacity human rights 
approach). The two are not of equal legal relevance: the latter approach reflects 
the current human rights approach to sterilisation and should be the approach that 
informs domestic legal frameworks. Importantly, the ‘but for’ approach which 
was flagged in P v P aligns with the approach to equality contained in the CRPD. 
The persistence by some states parties and scholars to adhere to the mental 
incapacity human rights approach to sterilisation might in part be due to a failure 
to appreciate both the centrality of how disability is viewed to how human rights 
are interpreted and applied and the now explicit redundancy of the medical 
approach to disability under the CRPD.  
In thinking about how the CRPD applies in Australia, it is recognised that 
Australia has an interpretative declaration to the CRPD which includes its 
understanding that the CRPD ‘allows for fully supported or substituted decision-
making arrangements … only where such arrangements are necessary, as a last 
resort and subject to safeguards’ and ‘that the Convention allows for compulsory 
assistance or treatment of persons, including measures taken for the treatment of 
mental disability, where such treatment is necessary, as a last resort and subject 
to safeguards’.80 Arguably, this might limit Australia’s strict legal obligations. 
Yet, beyond this, the CRPD offers a new approach for how law can conceptualise 
                                                 
79  Ibid 76–7. 
80  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratification by Australia, 13 August 1980, 2515 
UNTS 3 (with effect 16 August 2008); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Declaration 
2009 (Cth). 
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disability and the disabled human rights subject, and in turn the relationship 
between disability and violence. This invites new ethical and cultural approaches 
to disability which have fundamental implications for how law is reformed 
beyond a fixation on the decision-making process, towards the substance of 
decisions being made about interventions in (and violence against) women and 
girls’ bodies. This opens deeper philosophical, political and ethical questions 
about whether certain kinds of conduct should ever be permitted against people 
with disability because they should not be viewed as fundamentally different or 
exceptional to other humans.81  
Therefore, the ‘best interests’ test for court authorised sterilisation and the 
associated rejection of the ‘but for’ test under P v P reflects an outdated human 
rights approach based on the absolute difference of people with disability and 
their legitimate inequality to people without disability. The CRPD’s legal 
capacity approach to human rights unsettles the domestic law framework of court 
authorised sterilisation and brings into question the very existence of court 
authorised sterilisation itself by foregrounding the equality between people with 
and without disability and demanding the same standard of human rights for 
them. Australian domestic law reform is currently grappling with this human 
rights shift, yet largely unsuccessfully as I now turn to discuss. 
 
IV   SENATE COMMITTEE INQUIRY 
On 20 September 2012, the Senate Community Affairs Legislative 
Committee was tasked with inquiring into and reporting on the involuntary or 
coerced sterilisation of people with disability in Australia82  (which was later 
extended to intersexed children).83 The terms of reference included ‘the different 
legal, regulatory and policy frameworks and practices across the Commonwealth, 
states and territories, and action to date on the harmonisation of regimes’ and 
‘Australia’s compliance with its international obligations as they apply to 
sterilisation of people with disabilities’.84 Interestingly, the Senate Committee did 
not consider sterilisation pursuant to the defence of necessity. 
In its report, the Senate Committee received a number of submissions on 
sterilisation and human rights. The Committee began the discussion of its views 
by noting the division in submissions on the human rights status of sterilisation.85 
The submissions fell into one of the two human rights approaches discussed in 
Part III above. Leading disability advocacy organisations as well as some 
scholars whose submissions were premised on the contestation of medical 
                                                 
81  See generally Wadiwel, above n 47. 
82  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation, above n 3, 1 
[1.1]. 
83  Ibid 1 [1.2]. On the Senate Committee’s approach to intersex variations and sterilisation, see Aileen 
Kennedy, ‘Fixed at Birth: Medical and Legal Erasures of Intersex Variations’ (2016) 39 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 813. 
84  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 September 2012, 7474 (Rachel Siewert). 
85  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation, above n 3, 94 
[4.35]. 
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approaches to disability and the legal capacity human rights approach to 
sterilisation urged prohibition of court authorised sterilisation.86  On the other 
hand, submissions by some other scholars (who did not explicitly challenge the 
medical model of disability or engage with the cultural shift affected by the 
CRPD) and government bodies and medical practitioners (which work within the 
medical approach to disability and/or within the very legal frameworks of 
substituted decision-making whose legitimacy has been challenged by the 
CRPD) made very different human rights arguments by reference to the mental 
incapacity human rights approach in support of the continuation of sterilisation.87 
Submissions in this latter group argued that sterilisation could realise human 
rights such as rights to health and to live and participate in the community and 
that court authorisation was sufficient protection against any rights abuses. This 
latter group of submissions argued that reference to the human right of equality 
and non-discrimination would deny other human rights and hence should be 
irrelevant to the inquiry – a point I explore below. 
The Senate Committee’s consideration was focused on making sense of 
which of these two approaches to human rights should inform its consideration of 
whether sterilisation should be banned and, if not, whether the ‘best interests’ test 
should be changed (including to a ‘but for’ test of the nature rejected in P v P). In 
the remainder of this Part, and the following two Parts, I will make sense of the 
Senate Committee’s ultimate recommendations to retain court authorised 
sterilisation and to reform the legal test from ‘best interests’ to ‘best protection of 
rights’. I do so in order to understand how the Senate Committee defended these 
recommendations on international human rights grounds and by specific 
reference to the CRPD but in a manner not reflecting this Convention’s own legal 
capacity human rights approach to sterilisation and in a manner that perversely 
resulted in the very opposite result than that anticipated by the CRPD – the 
continuation of court authorised sterilisation. 
 
A   Persistence of Medical Approach to Disability 
Recalling that the fundamental aspect of the Disability Convention is a shift 
in the conceptualisation of disability and the disabled human rights subject, the 
foundational problem with the Senate Committee’s approach is that it viewed 
disability as an objective, fixed concept rather than contingent to social norms 
and subject to construction by law itself. Consequently, the Senate Committee 
                                                 
86  See, eg, Carolyn Frohmader, Women With Disabilities Australia, above n 1; People with Disability 
Australia, Submission No 50 to Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee, Inquiry into the 
Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People with Disabilities in Australia, March 2013; Linda Steele, 
Submission No 44 to Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee, Inquiry into the Involuntary or 
Coerced Sterilisation of People with Disabilities in Australia, 24 February 2013. 
87  See, eg, Wendy Bonython, Submission No 22 to Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee, 
Inquiry into the Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People with Disabilities in Australia, 14 February 
2013; Diana Bryant, Submission No 36 to Senate Affairs References Committee, Inquiry into the 
Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People with Disabilities in Australia, 22 February 2013; Adult 
Guardian of Queensland and the Public Advocate of Queensland, Submission No 19 to Senate 
Community Affairs Reference Committee, Inquiry into the Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People 
with Disabilities in Australia. 
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did not acknowledge and reject the medical approach to disability in the existing 
legal framework for court authorised sterilisation. The Senate Committee spent 
all but five paragraphs discussing how to approach disability88 and simply cited 
the World Health Organisation definition of disability as:  
an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations, and participation 
restrictions. An impairment is a problem in body function or structure; an activity 
limitation is a difficulty encountered by an individual in executing a task or 
action; while a participation restriction is a problem experienced by an individual 
in involvement in life situations. Disability is thus not just a health problem. It is a 
complex phenomenon, reflecting the interaction between features of a person’s 
body and features of the society in which he or she lives.89  
This definition focuses on disability as an individual medical deficit, because 
even though it recognises the impact of ‘features of the society’, it ultimately  
still defines impairment itself as a ‘problem in body function or structure’ and 
hence disability is at its core an inherent and embodied individual trait. While  
the Senate Committee did go on in subsequent pages to discuss various 
‘stereotypes’ encountered by people with disability in relation to sexuality, 
parenting and menstruation,90 there was no attempt to relate these stereotypes to 
the conceptualisation of disability and hence to challenge at a fundamental level 
the definition of disability that governs the legal framework for sterilisation. As 
will become apparent below, the Senate Committee’s medical approach to 
disability was fatal to its failure to disrupt the legal division of subjects on the 
basis of mental capacity and the ultimate retention of court authorised 
sterilisation as a realisation of human rights.91 
 
B   Retention of Court Authorised Sterilisation 
The Senate Committee decided that the system of court authorised 
sterilisation should be retained. In doing so, the Senate Committee preferred a 
human rights approach focused on procedural protection (reflecting the mental 
incapacity human rights approach) and thus overlooked the end result of this 
legal process – the discrimination and violence embedded in the act of 
sterilisation itself. 
Following from the retention of the medical approach to disability, the Senate 
Committee did not disrupt the division on the basis of mental capacity which is at 
the core of the majority’s reasoning in Marion’s Case. The Senate Committee 
accepted as self-evident that people with disability with mental incapacity should 
be subject to different legal thresholds in relation to consent (ie, substituted 
decision-making) and instead focused on making sure that people with disability 
who had mental capacity were not wrongly attributed mental incapacity. The 
Senate Committee was of the view that court authorised sterilisation is contrary 
to human rights only if the individual has mental capacity (again overlooking the 
                                                 
88  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation, above n 3, 4–5 
[1.16]–[1.20]. 
89  Ibid 4 [1.16] (emphasis added). 
90  Ibid 15–48 [2.1]–[2.114]. 
91  See Parker who foreshadowed the need for the Senate Committee to engage with conceptual issues: 
Parker, above n 3, 527.  
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fact that in light of the CRPD it is denial of legal capacity itself that is a core 
human rights issue): 
Failure to determine capacity strips persons with disabilities of their equality 
before the law. It perpetuates myths and stereotypes. … There is no place for 
substituted decision-making in Australia without first determining that the person 
is without the capacity to decide for themselves. … 
In those cases where there is not capacity for consent, and no reasonable prospect 
that it may develop, laws and procedures may permit the sterilisation of persons 
with disabilities, but the circumstances in which this may occur must be narrowly 
circumscribed, and based on the protection and advancement of the rights of the 
person. … In undertaking is [sic] review, the committee has as its objective the 
defence of the rights of persons with disabilities.92 
This illustrates that the Senate Committee works within rather than disrupts 
the division of legal subjects by reference to mental capacity as was set out in 
Marion’s Case. This division is central to the Senate Committee’s subsequent 
consideration of the significance to sterilisation of equality and non-
discrimination.  
In considering the issue of regulation and prohibition, the Senate Committee 
recognised competing approaches to human rights (along the lines discussed in 
Part III above).93 Ultimately, the Senate Committee was particularly persuaded by 
the arguments reflecting the mental incapacity human rights approach. 94  In 
support of this approach, the Senate Committee quoted a submission by Dr 
Wendy Bonython which identified the right to dignity and quality of life.95 The 
submissions reflecting the mental incapacity human rights approach clearly 
overlook the centrality of non-discrimination and equality which is at the core of 
the Disability Convention’s approach to sterilisation, as discussed earlier in Part 
III(B)(2). As discussed above, while no one human right should be privileged, 
the interconnectedness of human rights and the importance of equality to the 
realisation of all human rights were overlooked.  
The Senate Committee also considered the discrimination arguments  
about sterilisation, noting the polarisation of opinions on this point.96 The Senate 
Committee quoted the Adult Guardian of Queensland and the Public Advocate of 
Queensland who argued that it would be discriminatory to deny the option of 
sterilisation to women and girls with disability where it is available to women 
and girls without disability.97  
                                                 
92  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation, above n 3, 95 
[4.39], 96 [4.45] (emphasis added). 
93  Ibid 83 [4.1]. 
94  Ibid 94–5 [4.36]–[4.39], 96 [4.43]–[4.44]. 
95  Ibid 90 [4.22]. 
96  Ibid 92–3 [4.31]. 
97  Ibid 93 [4.32]: 
Preventing discrimination is as much about allowing people with disabilities the right to decide between 
the same range of options that are available to people who do not have a disability as it is about ensuring 
that people with disability are not forced to undergo procedures that would not be applied to a person 
without disability where all other circumstances are equal. ... In accordance with this approach, if society 
and the law allow a Queensland adult without disability to undergo a medical sterilisation procedure by a 
medical practitioner, then adults with disability, including those with impaired decision‐making capacity, 
should be afforded the same entitlement. 
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Unfortunately this approach held sway with the Senate Committee which 
concluded that it would be discriminatory to prohibit non-therapeutic 
sterilisation. Ultimately for a number of reasons this approach is problematic in 
arguing that women and girls with disability need sterilisation in order to be 
equal to women and girls without disability. First, it is important to pause here to 
note the vacuity of referring to the act of sterilisation as a ‘medical procedure’ – 
there is no recognition of the differential purpose or end to which sterilisation 
might be put vis-à-vis women and girls with and without disability, nor of the 
historical use of medical treatment as violence against people with disability 
(and, indeed, other marginalised groups such as women of racial and ethnic 
minorities, Indigenous women and poor women). Moreover, the reasons and 
timing of sterilisation of women and girls with disability (ie, prior to having any 
children or reaching a childbearing age, plus to address menstruation98) means 
that it is not the same as for women without disability (eg, as a contraceptive 
following sufficient children or as following a life decision not to have any 
children) and never considered for girls without disability (and this is confirmed 
by the Senate Committee’s earlier discussion of stereotypes about disability, 
gender and sexuality/parenting). Further, court authorised sterilisation is non-
therapeutic so not concerned with denying life-saving medical treatment to 
women or girls with disability, thus rendering the pervasive medical equality 
rationale problematic and obfuscating. The second respect is that court authorised 
sterilisation is never equal because there is a different person consenting – it is 
fundamentally unequal because for women and girls with disability they are not 
themselves given the opportunity of consenting. Following the CRPD this 
differentiation in consent simply cannot be sustained because it rests on a divide 
on the basis of mental capacity which itself is a source of inequality, an 
inequality which is then further compounded by the decisions that are enabled by 
virtue of this division. The CRPD makes absolutely clear that legal capacity is 
for all and denial of legal capacity on the basis of disability or mental incapacity 
is discrimination.99  
The Senate Committee stated: 
The views of United Nations committees and officials, as conveyed by submitters 
to the inquiry, clearly articulate the need to eliminate discrimination. Some 
members of the international community indicated that there is no place for 
sterilisation to occur without the consent of persons concerned. However, as many 
submitters to this inquiry recognised, direction from the international community 
about how best to support persons without capacity to consent is not clear. … 
supported decision-making is not only appropriate but is necessary to support the 
dignity and rights of persons with disabilities. The committee expects that, with 
appropriate supported decision-making, there will be very few Australians who 
altogether lack decision-making capacity. However, the rights of persons without 
                                                 
98  On the issue of temporality see generally Alison Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip (Indiana University Press, 
2013) 48–9, 53–7. 
99  Arguably (and to be facetious) to make it ‘equal’ on the basis argued by the Adult Guardian of 
Queensland and the Public Advocate of Queensland, above n 87, perhaps third party consent to 
sterilisation should be available for all regardless of disability whenever a third party can successfully 
argue it would be in the individual’s best interests. 
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decision-making capacity are no less valuable and no less valid. The rights of this 
minority require support and defence.100 
So, the Senate Committee was of the view that court authorised sterilisation 
and the denial of legal capacity brings about ‘equality’. Moreover, they suggested 
that equality (in the sense understood in international human rights law discussed 
in Part III(B)(2)) is not very relevant because this would homogenise people with 
disability and in turn remove their dignity: 
An outright ban of non-therapeutic sterilisation procedures without consent 
potentially denies the rights of persons with disabilities to access all available 
medical support on an equal basis with persons without a disability. It is a ‘one 
size fits all’ solution to a complex problem. An outright ban removes the focus 
from the needs and interests of the individual, placing it instead on generic notions 
of what is best for persons with disabilities as an homogenous group. On balance, 
the committee does not agree that Australia’s laws, including relevant court and 
tribunal procedures, should be unable to consider the circumstances of individuals. 
Flexibility in strictly limited circumstances may help to ensure that all appropriate 
support is provided to people with a disability.101 
This resort to anti-homogeneity as a human rights issue for people with 
disability is peculiar. This conveys the idea of people with disability as abnormal 
and outside full humanness. All people without a disability are perfectly capable 
of being ‘homogenised’ in a category in order to be viewed as equals for the 
purposes of comparison in the context of discrimination law. In contrast, rather 
than including people with disability as members of this common humanity (even 
in the face of their individual characteristics of human variation) the Senate 
Committee paints equality as negatively ‘homogenising’ in removing their 
differences (even though these very differences are the basis for their 
discrimination and sterilisation). As I will discuss further below, this approach 
constructs people with disability as incapable of comparison for discrimination 
purposes.  
In understanding the ‘logic’ of the Senate Committee retaining court 
authorised sterilisation specifically for women and girls with disability on the 
basis of a mental capacity/incapacity divide by reference to the CRPD but clearly 
reflecting the earlier mental incapacity human rights approach, it is important to 
contextualise the Committee’s recommendations in its broader approach to the 
CRPD. The Senate Committee was at pains to consider each mention of 
sterilisation in international human rights law and in light of Australia’s 
international law obligations. Yet, this approach is narrowly concerned with 
obligations (particularly in light of Australia’s interpretive declaration), rather 
than the cultural prism that the Convention provided (as was discussed in Part II 
above). As such the Senate Committee failed to consider how the cultural shift in 
approach to disability in the Convention provides a (realisable) ethical and legal 
ideal for the treatment of people with disability instead of being restricted to 
law’s current proscription in relation to disability. This resulted in a rather self-
referential approach to law reform which viewed current laws (in the sense of 
                                                 
100  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation, above n 3, 94 
[4.36]. 
101  Ibid 94 [4.37]. 
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domestic capacity-based legal contouring and ordering, and international legal 
obligations) as setting the limits to the reformed possibilities, rather than thinking 
beyond the laws, particularly where these current laws are oppressive.102 So, for 
example, the Committee could have decided that even if substituted decision-
making were to remain, some decisions about people’s bodies and lives – such as 
the decision to sterilise someone else – are beyond the reach of substituted 
decision-making. Moreover, the focus on article 12 and reduction of the issue to 
substituted versus supported decision-making did not sufficiently consider the 
relationship between article 12 and other articles of the CRPD. Considering legal 
capacity in relation to other articles would have shifted the focus away from the 
technical and institutional dimensions of legal capacity and towards the substance 
of decisions about legal capacity (eg, in this case the violence inherent in 
sterilisation). In focusing on the fairness of court authorisation procedure, the 
Senate Committee overlooked the issue that, regardless of whether substituted 
decision-making is contrary to human rights, there is a discriminatory outcome 
(and a violence in the outcome) of sterilising women and girls with disability. 
 
C   The Test for Court Authorised Sterilisation: From ‘Best Interests’ to 
‘Best Protection of Rights’ 
Having established that court authorised sterilisation should continue, the 
Senate Committee then considered whether the existing ‘best interests’ test for 
regulating court authorisation was sufficient. The Senate Committee accepted 
‘the evidence that was provided by many submitters showing that, as currently 
applied, “best interests” tests are currently at risk of “a slewed interpretation”’.103 
While this is positive because of the longstanding disability rights critique of the 
best interests test by reference to the discriminatory ideas it reflects, it elides the 
discrimination in the legal capacity divide itself, which creates the space for 
substituted decision-making of women and girls without mental capacity, within 
which the best interests test is located.  
The Senate Committee recommended replacing the ‘best interests’ test with a 
‘best protection of rights’ test.104 The ‘best protection of rights’ test would focus 
on authorising sterilisation where this enables the ‘[p]rotection of their rights’, 
‘[m]aximising [of] future options and choices’ and allows ‘[d]ecisions to be 
made on the basis of the best support services available’.105 In recommending the 
‘best protection of rights’ test, the Senate Committee rejected the relevance of 
                                                 
102  This might in part be due to the fact that one of the terms of reference was to ask whether existing laws 
meet current international obligations. 
103  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation, above n 3, 130 
[5.119]. 
104  It is interesting to note that the proposed test overlaps with the Australian Law Reform Commission’s 
(‘ALRC’) recommended proposed test for supported decision-making in its recent report on legal 
capacity. According to the ALRC, if an individual’s will and preference cannot be determined, then 
protection of ‘rights’ should guide decision-making: Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, 
Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, Report No 124 (2014) 75–85 [3.50]–[3.91]. I thank 
Fleur Beaupert for pointing this out. 
105  Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation, above n 3, 130 
[5.121]. 
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discrimination both in its own right as the ‘but for’ test or as a dimension of  
the proposed ‘best protection of rights’ test.106 The Committee was particularly 
persuaded by the submission against the ‘but for’ test made by the Chief Justice 
of the Family Court, citing P v P.107 The Committee stated: 
disability cannot be treated as an isolated feature of a person, which may be 
conceptually separated from the rest of their being. They are not defined by their 
disability, but neither is the disability a separable thing. Accordingly, courts 
should not construct tests as if it were possible to separate them. The committee is 
also concerned that a ‘but for’ test requires life without disability to be taken as 
the ‘norm’, and disability is then defined as deviance from that norm. Every 
person should be treated as equal, and the committee believes that a best 
protection of rights test, underpinned by a strong understanding and protection of 
equal rights, is the better approach.108 
Thus, curiously, court authorised sterilisation is not removed (contra the 
current international human rights approach that all should be prohibited) but will 
be authorised only where it will protect human rights (but not in relation to the 
right to non-discrimination which is central to the realisation of all human rights 
of people with disability). The Senate Committee’s reasoning is derived from the 
judicial decision in P v P in which the court considered that children with 
disability cannot be compared to children without disability. Thus, in order to 
analyse the status of non-discrimination in the ‘best protection of rights’ it is 
necessary to briefly return to P v P.  
 
1 P v P and the Incomprehensibility of Violence 
To recap, Marion’s Case held that the paramount consideration is always the 
best interests of the child. P v P built on this legal framework in holding that in 
determining what constitutes a girl’s best interests this cannot include 
consideration of non-discrimination. How was discrimination not relevant to the 
Family Court’s authorisation of parental consent? The Court’s logic involved it 
being impossible to remove from Lessli the characteristic of her intellectual 
disability in order to determine whether she would still be sterilised without her 
disability. The core and necessary question of any discrimination inquiry – would 
this sterilisation be conducted if this individual was not disabled – could not be 
answered here because there was no way to comprehend Lessli existing as 
‘Lessli’ without the disability. Children with disability could not be compared to 
children without disability because the Court saw disability as not being an 
isolatable factor that could be removed from the girl for the purposes of 
determining discrimination. Rather, the disability was inherent to and 
synonymous with the individual. This reflects the individualised, medical model 
of disability introduced above when discussing the mental incapacity human 
rights approach, rather than viewing disability as a systemic, social or political 
problem. Rendering Lessli beyond comparison and sterilisation a-discriminatory 
involved two stages.  
                                                 
106  Ibid 130–1 [5.118]–[5.127]. 
107  Ibid 127 [5.106]. 
108  Ibid 131 [5.124] (emphasis added). 
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First, the Court referred to disability as an ‘immutable characteristic’ and 
explained that her intellectual disability could not be ‘isolated as a factor and 
then “subtracted” from the constellation of facts about her’.109 All of the factors 
of Lessli – her intellectual disability, epilepsy, fertility and gender – were 
‘interactive and cumulative and it is their combined presence in the child which 
has led to the application before the Court’.110 Through characterising Lessli’s 
disability (and its relationship to herself) in this way, the Court naturalises 
disability as an internal quality of Lessli (as opposed to a social or cultural 
phenomenon) – her disability is an individual, medical characteristic which is the 
responsibility of the individual and beyond human control and social challenge.111 
More than this, the Court constructed disability as inherent to and synonymous 
with the individual: a ‘synecdoche’ for the individual.112 This conflation of the 
characteristic of disability with the very existence of the person is readily the 
case in relation to intellectual disability by reason of the pervasiveness in culture, 
and specifically in law, of the Cartesian split of mind and body – where the mind 
and the brain are core to what defines humans as a thinking and feeling (and 
legally responsible) species. 113  The production of disability as an immutable 
feature of the individual also negates the role of law (and specifically the Family 
Court’s welfare jurisdiction) in constituting the abnormal legal subject,114 a point 
returned to below. Moreover, any discriminatory treatment of the individual is 
not a systemic social or political problem – instead it ‘just is’ by reason of the 
individual’s natural makeup. 
The second stage of the reasoning in P v P is to identify intellectually 
disabled girls as not merely unequal but fundamentally different from other girls. 
Viewing girls with and without intellectual disability as the converse of each 
other is at odds with the very notion of discrimination which is premised on the 
fundamental equality of all humans – here there is no common ground to enable 
discrimination comparison. Girls without intellectual disability are referred to in 
the judgement as ‘intellectually normal’115 girls and Lessli is juxtaposed to this 
category. This location of Lessli as outside the category of ‘normal’ girls can be 
understood as constructing her as ‘abnormal’ in the meaning of critical disability 
studies. There is little discussion of Lessli’s intellectual or cognitive incapacities 
in a narrow sense, but rather the discussion focuses on the broader, applied 
contexts of her ability to meet gender and sexual norms of mothering, marriage, 
                                                 
109  P v P (1995) 126 FLR 245, 266 (The Court). 
110  Ibid. 
111  Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law (South 
End Press, 2011) 58. 
112  Mills, above n 50, n 48. 
113  Ngaire Naffine, Law’s Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal Person (Hart 
Publishing, 2009) 81–98. For a similar point in the context of human rights, see Quinn and Arstein-
Kerslake, above n 58, 41. 
114  See a similar point made by O’Connell in the context of stigmatisation: Karen O’Connell, ‘The Clean and 
Proper Body: Genetics, Stigma and Disability Discrimination Laws’ (2009) 14 Australian Journal of 
Human Rights 139, 145. 
115  P v P (1995) 126 FLR 245, 260, 264–6 (The Court) (emphasis added). 
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having children in marriage and self-managing her fertility, menstruation and 
sexuality.116 The Court states: 
The responsibility to assess the child’s best interests is not furthered by 
compartmentalising one or more of her attributes and measuring the 
appropriateness of the proposed treatment against a hypothetical child. … 
If applied literally the test would mean that sterilisation could never be authorised 
other than for therapeutic medical reasons, because one would never contemplate 
the sterilisation of an intellectually normal 17-year-old other than for such 
reasons. 
This is readily explicable upon the basis that an intellectually normal 17-year-old 
female, albeit suffering from epilepsy, can reasonably contemplate the likelihood 
that she may wish to engage in sexual intercourse for the purpose of having a child 
or children at any time during the next 35 years of her life, more commonly than 
not in the context of a marriage or like relationship and to raise and nurture such 
child or children. Further, she can consider and on advice decide upon the best 
method of contraception for her and to take or not to take contraceptives as she 
sees fit and to decide whether or not to have sexual intercourse as she sees fit. 
Finally, she can decide upon her own sterilisation, if not at the age of 17, at a time 
when she either decides as a mature adult that she does not wish to have a child or 
at a time when she does not wish to have further children. 
None of these considerations apply to a child like Lessli.117 
Central to the production of girls with intellectual disability as abnormal is 
the language which is used to describe their abnormality and the visceral 
aesthetics (in a broad sensorial meaning) of abnormality. The particular norms of 
ability, sexuality and gender that Lessli deviates from are centred on management 
of bodily boundaries, notably control of the visibility of menstrual blood because, 
for example, Lessli fails to wear or change pads to absorb the blood and has 
blood evident on her clothing.118 The descriptions of Lessli’s menstruation are not 
balanced by descriptions of ideal menstrual management, hygiene and emotional 
response. In the context of anti-discrimination law, Karen O’Connell states that 
anti-discrimination legislation concerns ‘questions of embodiment and 
materiality in often intimate detail’119 yet this intimate detail is restricted to the 
bodies of the abnormal whereas the normal female remains completely abstract 
and objective and devoid of any material content or identity.120 One implication 
of this is that ‘focusing on the body can limit the capacity to see the social and 
political construction of disability by returning to an idea of fixed and immutable 
impairment residing in the individual’.121 Moreover, the cultural representation of 
disability as abnormal, defective, useless and wasteful (here done by the visceral 
                                                 
116  Steele, ‘Disability, Abnormality and Criminal Law’, above n 20. 
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depictions of gendered bodily fluid) creates an opening for the greater 
permissibility of violence against the disabled body.122 
Through locating Lessli outside the category of ‘normal’ girls, it follows that 
abnormal girls with intellectual disability are not different in degree but different 
in kind – the converse of each other. The legal construction of girls with 
intellectual disability as the abnormal, binary opposite of able, ‘normal’ girls 
(both through the earlier recognition of incapacity and court authorised 
sterilisation, and here through the test for court authorisation) means that there is 
no common self or common body to enable this comparison at the centre of any 
discrimination inquiry. The construction of Lessli as abnormal necessitates 
placing girls with intellectual disability outside of full humanness and hence in a 
different category of human rights and subject to a different rights threshold. 
On the basis of her abnormality as a result of her inherent disability, Lessli, 
and all girls with intellectual disability who deviate from norms of ability, gender 
and sexuality, are beyond comparison to ‘normal’ girls and on this basis 
discrimination through their sterilisation is incomprehensible. Whereas it is 
comprehensible that sterilisation on the basis of race or religion is discriminatory, 
it is impossible for girls with disability to be discriminated against when they are 
sterilised, thus reflecting Nussbaum’s point of disability as one of the last 
bastions of legitimate discrimination.123 It also reflects comments made in the 
context of Australian anti-discrimination law by Margaret Thornton about the 
hollowness of equality vis-à-vis intellectual disability.124 Therefore, sterilisation 
in relation to this group of individuals is ‘a-discriminatory’ (that is, sterilisation 
exists outside of discrimination).  
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The construction of Lessli as abnormal in P v P not only has important 
relational effects in placing Lessli beyond comparison. The exclusion of Lessli 
from full humanness and a community of equal humans also has important legal 
spatial effects in separating Lessli from ‘normal’ girls, resulting in a legal 
boundary between abnormal and normal legal subjects and the carving out for 
girls with intellectual disability a separate legal space of legality and legitimacy 
(beyond the reach of discrimination law).125 Thus in P v P the non-application of 
discrimination law carves out a separate legal space for women with disability 
and in turn a separate category of legal subjects in relation to whom there is a 
different legal standard of permissible violence – a standard which is related to 
their abnormality. The focus on management of abnormality in turn means that 
the different treatment by reason of the legal framework of court authorised 
sterilisation is not detrimental, it is beneficial. This is reflected in the Court’s 
rejection of the ‘but for’ test:  
One of the significant limitations of a discrimination approach is that some form 
of comparison is necessarily implied between the individual complainant and 
other persons who are similarly situated save for the characteristic which, it is 
claimed, leads to discrimination. … 
The favoured legal model is founded on the strict formal equality approach which 
values treating likes alike, and unlikes differently. … 
However, even in this area it is important to note that to come to a conclusion that, 
but for a certain factor, an individual would or would not have been treated in a 
particular way, is not the same as a finding that the result is discriminatory. Not all 
distinctions give rise to detrimental treatment. … 
[W]e do not think that the ‘but for’ test commonly applied in discrimination cases 
can be readily transplanted into this Court’s welfare jurisdiction. In cases such as 
Lessli’s, it is precisely because a distinction is drawn between the child in question 
and others in the community by a party claiming that the proposed treatment is to 
the child’s benefit that the matter falls to be decided under the protective 
jurisdiction of the Court. … The key issue than becomes whether a proposed 
treatment is a benefit or a burden having regard to that individual child’s 
circumstances.126 
The girl who is the subject of this test is an ‘abnormal’ disabled girl, such that 
the ‘best interests’ test more specifically is: what is in the best interests of an 
abnormal child who is outside of social norms of sexuality, reproduction and 
mothering. The identity of the ‘child’ to whom the best interests test applies is 
contoured by reason of the non-application of discrimination, rather than merely 
the application of the best interests test reflecting discriminatory ideas. Moreover, 
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sterilisation becomes beneficial and protective, in a manner that is arguably 
‘unintended discrimination’ as per the discussion in Part III(B)(2). 
Thus, four points follow from P v P. The first is women and girls with 
disability are legally constructed as abnormal and beyond comparison with 
‘normal’, able individuals through their preliminary division on the basis of 
capacity in the system of court authorised sterilisation per se, and then in the test 
for court authorisation. The second point is that comparison between 
abnormal/disabled subjects of court authorised sterilisation and normal/able 
females is therefore impossible. Third, discrimination (which necessarily requires 
comparison between groups to ascertain inequality of treatment) is 
incomprehensible in relation to abnormal/disabled girls. The fourth point is that 
discrimination has been excluded from the legal framework of sterilisation and in 
turn the disabled female legal subjects of court authorised sterilisation 
applications exist outside of discrimination and in a separate legal space subject 
to different standards concerning the legality and legitimacy of sterilisation.  
While P v P excluded the right to non-discrimination in the context of the 
best interests test, the Senate Committee went one step further and excluded this 
right in the context of a test purportedly about protecting human rights: the ‘best 
protection of rights’ test. 
 
2 Senate Report: Human Rights Are Best Protected through Violence 
The Senate Committee adopted the submission of the Chief Justice of the 
Family Court of Australia in following rather than critiquing the reasoning in P v 
P concerning the relevance of non-discrimination to the test for court 
authorisation of sterilisation, and this rests on the core failure of the Senate 
Committee to critique a medical approach to disability and the related mental 
capacity/incapacity divide. The Committee focused on the idea of disability as 
inseparable from the self as the basis for the incomprehensibility of 
discrimination (as demonstrated in the reference to disability being incapable of 
being ‘treated as an isolated feature of a person, which may be conceptually 
separated from the rest of their being’127). Curiously, the Committee argued that 
non-discrimination would result in disability being treated as abnormality and 
this was not the best way to protect equality (‘a “but for” test requires life 
without disability to be taken as the ‘norm’, and disability is then defined as 
deviance from that norm’128) rather than appreciating that it is the inapplicability 
of discrimination that is caused by and itself produces abnormality: 
the committee agreed with the Full Court of the Family Court, that a ‘but for’ test 
should not be adopted by courts and tribunals. … a disability cannot be treated as 
an isolated feature of a person, which may be conceptually separated from the rest 
of their being. They are not defined by their disability, but neither is the disability 
a separable thing. Accordingly, courts should not construct tests as if it were 
possible to separate them. The committee is also concerned that a ‘but for’ test 
requires life without disability to be taken as the ‘norm’, and disability is then 
defined as deviance from that norm. Every person should be treated as equal, and 
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the committee believes that a best protection of rights test, underpinned by a 
strong understanding and protection of equal rights, is the better approach.129 
What sets the Committee’s approach apart from P v P is the simultaneous 
adoption of a rights-based test and a rejection of the relevance of discrimination 
to this test. But how can a test protect human rights but not the right of equality 
and non-discrimination? On closer examination, the ‘rights’ which the ‘best 
protection of rights’ test embodies are the rights of girls with intellectual 
disability as an abnormal and unequal group of individuals – in the vein of the 
pre-CRPD mental incapacity human rights approach.130 The focus in the ‘best 
protection of rights’ test is medical rights. This is reflected in the Committee’s 
explanation of this test: 
whether an action represents the best available protection and fulfilment of a 
person’s rights … should include recognition that a person with a disability should 
have the same right to access medical procedures in pursuit of quality of life as 
does a person without a disability.131 
Essentially, the Senate Committee’s approach is about rights to access 
medical treatment, rather than the broader and interdependent conception of 
rights in the CRPD. The Committee’s emphasis on rights to access medical 
treatment constructs the rights of the girls as strictly medical beings (contrary to 
the meaning of disability promoted in the CRPD and reflecting the earlier mental 
incapacity human rights approach to human rights for people with disability). 
Further, the focus is on women and girls with disability as abnormal medical 
beings by suggesting that sterilisation is what protects quality of life rather than 
sterilisation being seen as a violent denigration of quality of life (if sterilisation is 
de-medicalised and framed as an act of violence, through the application of the 
‘best protection of rights’ test girls with intellectual disability have the right to 
access violence132). Moreover, the Senate Committee’s approach overlooks that 
the physical and mental effects of sterilisation are themselves further disabling – 
thus creating greater inequality and further limitations to meeting social norms 
and realising the lifestyles and life courses of women without disability.133  
The rights implicated in the best protection of rights test are heavily gendered 
– the ‘right’ to be a ‘functional’ woman trumps core rights to equality and non-
discrimination. Other rights implicit in the ‘best protection of rights’ test (in light 
of the discussions in the report as a whole) include those related to inclusion in 
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society (including participation in work and being cared for by family), avoiding 
institutionalisation, and general wellbeing in not being distressed by menstruation 
or vulnerable to pregnancy through sexual assault. Through the delineation of 
rights in the test, individuals not only become medicalised but become very 
functional beings whose quality of day-to-day life is seen as trumping the core 
right of non-discrimination and consequently any sense of political, legal and 
social equality is trivialised. What has no function goes and what is needed to 
function (in a very narrow sense) is changed. This is heavily gendered. 
Reproductive organs and processes are reduced to function – if they will not be 
used in a very narrow sense then they are not needed – and they have no role in 
the broader identity of females.134 The ‘rights’ reflected are those which suppress 
the physical manifestations of abnormality but fall short of transforming the 
individual into a ‘normal’ individual – instead they mimic some aspects of 
‘normal’ life but not core aspects of ‘normal’ female gender because through 
sterilisation girls with intellectual disability are prevented from menstruating and 
having children. The ‘best protection of rights’ test maintains the divide between 
normality and abnormality.135  
The concept of discrimination constructs individuals as fundamentally equal 
and hence as belonging to a shared community. It does not posit an outside, but 
rather assumes an all-encompassing inside: a common humanity. The difficulty 
then in placing women and girls with disability as beyond the realm of 
discrimination is that it is a way in which they are legally constructed not only as 
unequal but in turn as excluded from shared community. The material effects of 
this are evident in the implications that sterilisation has on exclusion from a 
number of life processes and experiences, but culturally it is also apparent 
through the legal discourse of saying they are unequal. Ultimately, the ‘best 
protection of rights’ test results in the perverse situation where sterilisation, 
which pursuant to the CRPD is an act of violence and discrimination, is the 
means by which the rights to a non-sexual and ‘functional’ ‘inclusion’ and 
‘quality of life’ can be realised at the same time that the sterilised girls are denied 
the right to equality and non-discrimination.136 On a broader level this approach 
reflects a disappointing regression from the CRPD to a separate system of human 
rights for people with disability reflective of the earlier mental incapacity human 
rights approach.  
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V   CONCLUSION 
In Foucault and the Politics of Rights, Ben Golder suggests that human rights 
can be used strategically, but there is always the risk that they can result in 
further discipline of (and violence on) human rights subjects.137 This is evident in 
the context of this article’s analysis of the Senate Committee’s ‘human rights’ 
approach to sterilisation where, despite the cultural shifts of the CRPD, 
ultimately women and girls with disability by reason of their abnormality are not 
included in full humanness and full community, and hence are not subject to the 
same human rights thresholds as women and girls without disability in being 
exposed to state-sanctioned discrimination and violence in the form of court 
authorised sterilisation. Moreover, the insistence that sterilisation can be the 
means for the realisation of the human rights of disabled women and girls is a 
perspective based on a narrow conception of human rights for two reasons. First, 
this perspective already excludes equality and non-discrimination. Second, this 
perspective focuses on particular rights – the right to health, to be in the 
community – which implicitly assume a certain mode of human flourishing and 
being that retains and, indeed, exacerbates their difference, inequality and 
separateness and in turn further disables them via discrimination and violence. 
The Senate Committee’s recommendations mark a worrying consolidation of 
the lawful violence done to women and girls with disability through court 
authorised sterilisation because no longer is sterilisation merely necessary for the 
protection of the individual, but is now necessary for their protection as a rights-
bearing citizen. This shift demonstrates the risk (typically discussed in the larger-
scaled geopolitical contexts of international development and international 
humanitarian interventions) that rights discourse can be subsumed into a 
humanitarianism that mobilises violence against people with disability (or 
violence that disables) masked as benevolence.138 As such, this article has not 
only shown the fundamental problems with the current human rights approach to 
sterilisation, it has also begun to map some of the complex cultural co-
constructions in international human rights law of disability, humanity and 
violence and shown how these have legal impacts on domestic law reform and 
very material impacts on the bodies of women and girls with disability. Yet, my 
analysis suggests that it is not human rights per se which is problematic, but 
rather one’s approach to human rights and to disability.139 Mindful of Golder’s 
suggestion that human rights can be of strategic value, my analysis suggests that 
engagement with human rights by disability rights advocates in the course of 
participating in domestic law reform might extend to engagement with the 
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intersection of the cultural and the material dimensions of law, disability and 
violence. My analysis has shown that this intersection is a vital site for the 
continued legality and legitimacy of violence against women and girls with 
disability.140 
In its recent report into disability violence, the Senate Community Affairs 
Reference Committee in a welcome and surprising turn has recognised disability-
specific interventions as capable of being understood as violence against people 
with disability.141 Building on the momentum of this report (and mindful of its 
worrying failure to explicitly name sterilisation as violence), it is timely to 
demand that the Australian government recognise court authorised sterilisation 
against women and girls with disability as a human rights violation. This is 
becoming increasingly necessary by reason of the enhanced focus on violence 
against people with disability as a public policy issue, as seen in the questions 
around redress and reparations in the Royal Commission into Institutional 
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse 142  and the discussion on safeguarding 
provisions of the National Disability Insurance Scheme, as well as the persistent 
invisibility of violence against women with disability (particularly lawful 
violence) in mainstream public discussion on violence against women 
generally.143 Yet, discussion should not stop at prospective matters of prohibiting 
and making legally actionable future instances of sterilisation, but additionally 
extend to developing a system to recognise, remedy and remember past instances 
of sterilisation when they were still lawful.144 This might involve thinking about 
how law (both international and domestic legal frameworks) has dealt with mass 
atrocities, historical injustices and state-sanctioned violence in relation to other 
marginalised groups (though surprisingly rarely specifically in relation to people 
with disability as a distinct marginalised group).145 Whether at a domestic level 
these demands are met depends on the willingness of law reformers, law makers 
and the public at large to confront long-held conceptions of disability and to 
challenge what violence against women and girls with disability we are willing to 
accept and have the law authorise. 
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